August 20, 2004
By Bing and Owen West
Stop Using Soldiers as Pawns in Iraq.
Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently said offensives against rebel cities like Fallujah would be conducted jointly with Iraqi forces expected to be ready for combat by December. That raises the question of who will be in charge of those battles – Iraqis or Americans. After Vietnam, American commanders vowed that our soldiers would never again be buffeted by erratic political currents. In the recent battles in Iraq, however, politics altered the missions of our troops after they had suffered substantial casualties fighting for initial objectives. While political decisions should control military actions, policymakers must be careful lest our soldiers conclude that political tactics are flicking them on and off like a light switch.
In early April, after the bodies of four slain American contractors were mutilated in Fallujah, the White House ordered the Marines to seize that rebellious city. The US military spokesman in Baghdad said the response would be “overwhelming.” After Vietnam, the US military had jettisoned the doctrine of ‘proportional,’ attrition-based warfare in favor of applying swift, overwhelming force. A week after ordering the Marines into Fallujah, President Bush reiterated his belief in employing decisive force.
“Over the last several decades, we’ve seen that any concession or retreat on our part will only embolden this enemy and invite more bloodshed,” the President said. “There is no alternative to resolute actions.”
But when the Marines were within two days of finishing the operation—ironically named Vigilant Resolve—the White House yielded to political protests from the interim Iraqi government and the CPA. The Marines were told they could not take Fallujah.
Also during April, the radical Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, ordered his followers to rebel. The U.S. 1st Armored Division was directed to “destroy the Mahdi army.” Lieutenant General Sanchez, commander of the coalition forces in Iraq, reiterated that the mission was “to kill or capture its membership and leadership.” The soldiers of Old Ironsides pushed the rebels out of city after city, finally trapping Sadr in Najaf. Then, as in Fallujah, fear of a backlash due to battle damage led the administration to call off the final attack.
In August, Sadr went on the offensive again in Najaf, and again resolute words were uttered. The interim Iraqi Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, said military operations would be a “full partnership” between the Iraqis and the Americans. US Marines and Army soldiers fought resolutely in 130-degree heat. When once again the enemy was on the ropes, Allawi backed off, agreeing to let Sadr and his militia go.
In all three battles, the insurgents made mistakes that should have ended them. The difficulty in fighting guerrillas is fixing them for a set-piece battle. The Iraqi insurgents not only massed but challenged the American forces to fight. In Najaf, Sadr was twice cornered. In Fallujah, a key leader of the Sunni insurgency, Al Janabi, and the Zarqawi terrorist gang were trapped. These were the opportunities the American generals had been waiting for. Once the insurgents were surrounded, they faced destruction.
We learned in Vietnam that engaging in a cycle of fight-ceasefire-fight enabled the opponent to regroup, resulting in a war of attrition we could not win. In Fallujah and Najaf, we repeated that mistake. American soldiers died without breaking the will of the enemy to resist in the future. In each case, the military imperative gave way to political pressures that were predictable when the US forces were ordered into battle. While there are sound reasons for negotiations, the time for working out those conditions is before, not during battle.
Our civilian leaders rightly intend for our military to work in partnership with the Iraqi government. The difficulty comes not in planning discussions but in execution orders. Extending partnership to the battlefield by definition means a bifurcated rather than a unified chain of command. The Iraqis asked the Americans to go into combat in Najaf because their own security forces were losing. ”We’ll continue operations as the prime minister … sees fit,” said a spokesman for the Marine unit involved. “We’re sitting here waiting for authorization to go clear the militia.” Hence, the Iraqis decided both when Americans went into combat and when they were pulled from combat.
Mr. Rumsfeld has said Fallujah “will be restored under the control of the Iraqi government.” In the hard urban combat that lies ahead, US and Iraqi forces will work in concert. But no one should be our “partner” in committing or de-committing Americans in battle.
To avoid future confusion about US battlefield missions, there should be only one chain of command. Inside the Pentagon, that chain is simple and clear. The Secretary of Defense issues a written ‘execute order’ spelling out the mission. If Prime Minister Allawi (again) wants Fallujah seized, there should be an order signed by Secretary Rumsfeld. If he wants to halt another offensive in mid-stride, that, too, would require a blessing and a signature.
Iraqi politicians have persistently confused political maneuvers with military objectives. It’s time to separate the two. American soldiers are not political bargaining chips for Iraqi officials. Infantrymen fight for each other, for their leaders and for winning the battle. When the nation commits them to battle, intend to win. There is no alternative to resolute action.